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Abstract 
This paper examines the mid-1840s expansion of the British railway network, which 
was associated with a large deterioration in shareholder value. Using a counterfactual 
approach and new data on railway competition, we argue that the expansion of the 
railway companies, and their subsequent decline in financial performance, was not 
due to managerial failure. Rather, the promotion of new routes by established railways 
and mergers with other companies was part of a managerial strategy to maintain 
incumbent positions, and may have been preferable to not expanding whilst their 
competitors did.  
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1. Introduction 
As is well known, Chandler argues that managerial failure was at the heart of poor 
corporate performance in Britain from the late nineteenth century onwards.
1
   The 
managerial failure was that, unlike their American counterparts, British firms did not 
develop sophisticated impersonal administrative hierarchies. Much of the blame for 
this deficiency was placed by Chandler at the feet of family ownership, whereby 
executives were chosen for nepotistic reasons rather than managerial competence, 
resulting in amateurish managers.
2
  This widespread managerial malaise is alleged to 
have played a role in the decline of the UK economy.
3
  However, this view has been 
somewhat moderated by cliometric studies of late Victorian and early Edwardian 
companies.
4
  
The Chandler thesis has recently been challenged by Hannah and Foreman-
Peck who show that ownership amongst the 337 largest UK companies in 1911 was 
highly dispersed and that large companies in 1911 had a separation of ownership from 
control, which meant that Chandler’s caricature of the UK’s corporate economy being 
dominated by large family-owned firms is far from reality.
5
  However, this divorce of 
ownership from control may have created an agency problem in that executives of 
these large companies mismanaged them and did not run them in the interests of 
shareholders.  Notably, many of the largest companies in 1911 were railways, which 
were all characterised by a divorce of ownership from control.  Despite this, Chandler 
has suggested that, unlike in the United States, Victorian and Edwardian railways 
were poorly managed.
6
  Notably, other studies hold up the railways as exemplars of 
managerial failure in this era, arising either from the lack of competition they faced or 
their diffuse ownership structure.
7
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In this paper, we ask whether managerial failure was present in the railway 
sector much earlier in the nineteenth century – at the point at which railway 
technology was widely adopted.
8
 The latter half of the 1840s can be regarded as the 
heroic age of British railway construction, with the size of the network trebling within 
just a few years. However, this expansion resulted in an enduring legacy of low 
returns on capital, and meagre dividends, for railway shareholders. The focus of this 
paper is on whether the decision to expand, and subsequent investor losses, was due to 
managerial failure in that railway managers were hubristic, incompetent, or 
amateurish.  Managerial failure may have occurred because many railway companies 
had diffuse ownership, and a divorce of ownership from control, due to their large 
capital requirements.
9
   
Alternatively, the losses for investors could simply be a by-product of the 
wide-scale adoption of the then-new railway technology. Each individual railway 
company had to decide whether to expand within the context of a changing 
competitive environment. The situation may be likened to a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’. The 
best outcome may have been for no company to expand, but given that new 
competitors were arriving and established rivals were expanding, it became optimal 
for each individual railway to also expand. 
 Our main contribution is that we examine the ways in which managers of 
incumbent railways responded to the threat from competitors and we ask whether or 
not the managers of these railways made strategic mistakes in their response to the 
promotion boom. Using a counterfactual approach, our results suggest that the 
expansion of the railway companies, and their subsequent decline in financial 
performance, was not necessarily due to managerial failure. Rather, the promotion of 
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new routes by established railways and mergers with other companies was part of a 
strategy to maintain their incumbent positions. 
We also make two other contributions to the literature on the ‘Railway 
Mania’.10  As is well established in the historiography of British railway development, 
the rail network expanded substantially in the 1840s, with railways entering less 
populous areas and railways facing competition from rival companies.
11
  However, 
using details on every railway station and rail journey from Bradshaw’s Railway 
Guide and the Djikstra shortest-path algorithm, we provide the first measure of the 
extent to which railway companies experienced an increase in competition in the 
1840s.
12
  This enables us to ascertain whether the expansion of individual companies 
was correlated with an increase in competition.  It is also well established in the 
historiography that the expansion of the railways during the 1840s was followed by a 
diminution of profitability and poor returns for investors.
13
  Using share price and 
dividend data for every railway company, we provide an estimate of the extent to 
which shareholders were affected over the long run by the expansion of railways 
during the ‘Railway Mania’.14  
This paper also contributes to the growing historiography of British capital 
markets in the nineteenth century.  To date, this literature has mainly focussed on the 
performance of the equity market, the structure of the London stock exchange, the 
role of dividends, and the characteristics of investors.
15
  Our paper contributes to this 
literature as the railway boom of the 1840s resulted in the largest expansion of the 
equity market during the entire nineteenth century, and, according to Grossman’s 
figures, railways continued to dominate the market until the end of the century.
16
           
The paper is structured as follows.  The next section provides a brief historical 
sketch of the railway sector prior to and during the promotion boom.  The third 
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section examines the effect of the expansion of the network on competition. The 
fourth section describes the effect of network expansion on company performance and 
shareholder value.  The fifth section considers whether the destruction of shareholder 
value in established railways was due to managerial failure.  The sixth section 
considers whether firms which expanded the most experienced better financial 
performance.  The seventh section is a brief conclusion. 
 
2. An overview of railways in the 1840s 
Although the early railways were private ventures, they required Parliamentary 
authorisation, mainly because of the need to force landowners to sell the land along 
the route that the railway was to take. As a result, railways were incorporated 
enterprises with shareholders enjoying limited liability.
17
  The first modern passenger 
railway was the Liverpool and Manchester railway, which was authorised in 1826, 
and opened in 1830.  Subsequently, during the mid-1830s, many new railway 
companies were promoted, with Parliament authorising 59 new railways, having a 
nominal capital of £36.4m.
18
  Figure 1 shows the railway network in existence in 
1843, which was operated by just over 40 companies, with an average of 36 miles of 
track each. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 1 >> 
There was very strong economic growth and abundant harvests in 1843 and 
1844 as a result of a period of good weather.
19
 Anticipating that these improved 
economic conditions might reinvigorate further investment in railways, William 
Gladstone, then President of the Board of Trade, moved for a Parliamentary Select 
Committee to consider the future regulation of railways. After considerable 
opposition, the Railways Act was passed in July 1844, requiring at least one train per 
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day to carry passengers at a rate of 1d per mile.
20
 The Act also left open the possibility 
of the government sanctioning new competing lines, and even nationalisation of lines 
authorised after 1844.  Average fares for the ten largest railways fell, but the increase 
in passenger numbers and goods traffic was such that receipts grew by 42 per cent 
between 1842 and 1846.
21
 These increases in traffic and receipts were achieved with a 
relatively small increase of 25 per cent in the mileage open of the ten largest lines. 
These changes led to most of the large established railway companies increasing their 
dividends substantially.
22
   
During 1844, projected railways had been scrutinised by a Railway Board, 
which took an overall view of railway proposals and wanted Parliament to ration 
schemes with a view to building an integrated national rail network.
23
  However, 
Parliament ignored 35.5 per cent of their recommendations,
24
  and the Railway Board 
was disbanded on July 10 1845.
25
 This made it more likely that a railway bill would 
be evaluated on its social costs and benefits in isolation from national considerations, 
a process which was sub-optimal as it did not take account of network externalities 
and wasteful competition arising from duplication of routes.
26
   
The promotion of new railway lines reached unprecedented levels in the 
autumn of 1845. An estimated 1,263 new railways were attempting to meet the 
November 30 deadline for the submission of proposals for the next Parliamentary 
session.
27
  Such was the level of promotion that Herapath’s Railway and Commercial 
Journal and the Railway Times, the two leading railway periodicals, both printed up to 
three weekly supplements during September and October 1845 to cope with the 
demand for advertising new railway schemes.
28
  As can be seen from Figure 2, there 
was a very dramatic increase in adverts in the Railway Times in the late summer and 
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autumn of 1845, and this coincided with the turning point of the railway share price 
index
29
. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 2 >> 
The increase in promotional activity which followed the disbandment of the 
Railway Board, and the likelihood that Parliament would be lenient in its 
authorisation process, began to raise concerns.  The Times, in a series of articles from 
July onwards, raised the alarm about the effects of the new proposed railways.
30
 The 
Economist commenced publication of its ‘Railway Monitor’ on October 4 1845, in 
which they began an extensive and detailed critique of the negative effects which 
these new railways would have.
31
 
As can be seen from Figure 2, after the initial declines at the end of 1845, 
railway share prices fell steadily during the remainder of the decade, having fallen by 
66 per cent from their peak by April 1850. During this time, those lines which had 
been promoted during the boom, and which had received Parliamentary authorisation, 
began laying their lines, with estimates by Mitchell suggesting that railway 
construction represented 5.7 per cent of GDP in 1846, 6.7 per cent in 1847, and 4.7 
per cent in 1848.
32
 
To place the expansion of the railway industry during the 1840s in its long-run 
context, Figure 3 shows the total par value (i.e., actual capital invested) of British 
railways between 1825 and 1870, which are quoted on the London Stock Exchange 
and reported in the Course of the Exchange. Figure 3 clearly suggests that the 
expansion of railways was substantial and dramatic during the mid-1840s.  
<< INSERT FIGURE 3 >> 
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3. Network Expansion 
The magnitude of the railway network’s extension between 1843 and 1850 can be 
seen from Figure 1, which illustrates the railways which had been constructed up to 
1843 in yellow, and those constructed between 1843 and 1850 in blue. The early lines 
provided the spine of the network, which was then considerably expanded as a result 
of projects which were promoted during the promotion boom.  In this section, we 
consider two aspects of the network expansion.  First, we look at the differences in 
districts served by railways in 1843 and 1850 to see to what extent the expansion of 
railways was into less populous, and therefore less remunerative, areas.  Second, we 
look at the extent to which there was duplication of routes and an increase in 
competition as a result of the expansion of the network.     
 
3.1 Districts served by Railways 
The population of an area would have an impact on both the potential for passenger 
traffic, which represented 51.1 per cent of receipts in 1850, and to some extent the 
volume of freight.
33
 Thus a possible problem with the railway construction of the 
1840s was that the most populous districts were already being served by the railway 
network, with the result that any subsequent construction would either involve 
increasing the density of the network within existing areas or expansion into less 
populous districts. To examine this issue, the  population, as reported in the 1851 
Census, of the registration districts (of which there were 694 in Great Britain) served 
by railways in 1843 have been compared to those served by railways in 1850, after 
most of the railways which had been projected during the boom had been 
constructed.
34
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The names of each railway station open in 1843 and 1850 were obtained from 
Bradshaw's Monthly General Railway and Steam Navigation Guide. The 
corresponding registration district for each of these stations was determined by using 
the accompaniment to the 1851 Census, the Index to the Names of the Parishes, 
Townships, and Places in the Population tables of Great Britain, and supplemented 
with the GENUKI Gazetteer and the Vision of Britain historical units database. The 
population of each district in 1843 and 1850 was estimated by assuming that the 
population changed in a linear fashion between the 1841 and 1851 Census. 
To analyse the differences in the characteristics of districts served by railways 
in 1843 and 1850, the figures for the median district are reported, and the differences 
in medians between 1843 and 1850 are shown.
35
 Table 1 shows that those districts 
which had been newly served by a railway station between 1843 and 1850 had 
substantially lower populations and population densities than the districts which had 
been served prior to the Mania. This suggests that much of the construction which 
occurred between 1843 and 1850 was into areas where there would potentially be less 
traffic.  The Mann-Whitney tests in Table 1 confirm significant differences between 
the districts served in 1843, and the new districts in 1850, in terms of population, 
population density, mileage and the number of stations.
36
  
<< INSERT TABLE 1 >> 
Table 1 also shows that there was an increase in the extent of the network 
within districts which had already been served prior to 1843, with an increase in both 
the railway mileage and the number of stations in these areas. This implies that there 
was also a considerable increase in the density of the network within existing districts, 
which may imply that there was duplication of some routes. 
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3.2 Competition and duplication of routes 
To examine the extent to which construction of new railway lines duplicated existing 
routes, we compare levels of competition in the railway network in 1843 with 1850. 
To compare levels of competition, we ask whether passengers could have taken an 
alternative route to make their journey. If no alternative railway route was available 
for a particular railway line, then we regard that line as having a monopoly. If an 
alternative was available, the degree of competition was measured by calculating the 
additional cost to passengers from taking the alternative rather than the original line.  
There are two basic assumptions underlying this measure of railway competition.   
First, it assumes that railway companies competed on price to attract 
passengers to switch to a slower / longer route.  There is ample evidence to suggest 
that companies competed aggressively (and ruinously on occasions) on fares and rates 
in order to attract passengers and freight from shorter / faster rivals.
37
   Even the Great 
Western Railway was not immune from attempting to compete with a superior rival 
by cutting its rates.
38
 Second, it assumes that service demand is relatively elastic.  In 
other words, passengers and other users are relatively sensitive to changes in 
combined travel costs (i.e., time as well as fares and freight rates).  Notably, in terms 
of fares and freight rates, the price elasticity of demand is assumed to be unitary in the 
social savings literature.
39
  It is possible that other factors such as the safety of each 
line, its reliability, or the quality of its service, may also have influenced passengers, 
but they were likely to have been secondary considerations. The fact that companies 
competed aggressively for custom even though they had an inferior route would also 
tend to suggest that the service demand was relatively elastic.      
To perform the analysis, the railway routes which were listed in Bradshaw's 
Railway Guides in 1843 and 1850 were digitised. This guide included information on 
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which stations were directly connected by a segment of railway line, and how long 
that segment was.  By considering all of the segments in Great Britain, it was possible 
to calculate the shortest route between every pair of stations on the railway network. 
Assuming that a passenger could begin at any of the railway stations in the network 
and attempt to travel to any of the other stations, n(n-1) journeys are possible, where n 
is number of stations. In 1843, there were 353 stations, meaning that 124,256 journeys 
were possible, and in 1850, there were 1,480 stations, implying 2,188,920 possible 
journeys. 
For 1843 and 1850, the shortest path between each station was calculated by 
applying the Djikstra shortest-path algorithm.
40
  The Djikstra shortest path algorithm 
as applied to the railway network calculates the shortest path between railway stations 
by first evaluating the distance between a starting railway station, and all 
neighbouring railway stations. Once this calculation had been performed this railway 
station was marked as visited. The process was repeated by evaluating the distance 
between another railway station and all of its unvisited neighbouring railway stations. 
The minimum cost of travelling between railway stations was recorded, and only 
overwritten if a route with a lower cost was discovered. After iterating through all 
railway stations, the optimal route between all railway stations was determined. 
Travel between two stations was only possible when a railway line connected 
them. The cost of travelling between adjacent stations was defined as the mileage of 
railway track between them. In 81 per cent of segments, the mileage is stated in 
Bradshaw’s Railway Guide. In 16 per cent of segments, the travel time was used, and 
converted to a distance assuming a speed of 20mph. For the remaining three per cent 
of stations, we only had the departure time of trains so the straight line distance is 
used. Although stations within London were not directly connected in either 1843 or 
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1850, they are regarded as a single terminus, as otherwise travel between much of the 
network would not be possible.  
Robustness tests shown in Appendix Table 1 consider whether the main 
results change when using alternative scenarios for those 16 per cent of segments 
where travel time is used to estimate the distance between stations. Leunig has found 
that in 1850 the average, as the crow-flies, speeds on major routes was 22.7 mph and 
on minor routes was 17.8 mph, with a rule of thumb being that track speeds exceeded 
crow-flies speeds by 15 per cent.
41
 The baseline results assumed a speed of 20 mph, 
but Appendix Table 1 shows that using a reasonable range of other possible speeds, 
namely 15 mph or 25 mph, has little impact on the findings. 
These Djikstra shortest-path calculations enabled the development of a matrix 
which reported the length of the shortest route, where possible, between each of the 
stations in the rail network. A subset of this matrix, for a selection of stations in 1843, 
is given in Panel A of Table 2, which shows the distance in miles between several 
major stations. 
<< INSERT TABLE 2 >> 
To analyse the availability of alternative routes, the Djikstra shortest-path 
analysis was then repeated, but we assumed that an individual rail line between two 
stations had been removed from the network. This reveals how easy it was for 
passengers to substitute away from this line, and therefore the degree of competition 
to which it was exposed. 
As an example, Panel B of Table 2 shows the shortest route between a 
selection of major stations in 1843, assuming that the line between Blisworth and 
Roade, part of the London and Birmingham railway, was not available. Its removal 
implies that 40 of the 72 possible journeys can no longer be undertaken by rail. This 
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implies that this segment of railway line had a monopoly on traffic between these 40 
pairs of stations. 
This analysis was repeated for each segment in the network. Table 3 shows 
how many segments had a monopoly on the routes which they affected, meaning that 
no substitute was available. In 1843, 67 per cent of the segments had no substitute 
available. An analysis of these 1843 lines in 1850, suggests that only 18 per cent had 
no substitute available after the expansion of the network. When the full network in 
1850 is analysed, a similar pattern emerges, with only 29 per cent of lines having no 
substitutes. 
To determine which lines were of most importance, the segments were 
categorised into quintiles, depending on the number of journeys which they affected. 
Table 3 suggests that the least important lines (e.g., minor branch lines) were least 
exposed to competition, but the decline in the number of segments which had a 
monopoly between 1843 and 1850 occurred across segments irrespective of their 
importance. 
<< INSERT TABLE 3 >> 
The results in Table 3 suggest that the number of lines which enjoyed an 
absolute monopoly was reduced between 1843 and 1850. However, it could be 
possible that the substitutes which were available in 1850 required such a circuitous 
journey that they were an implausible alternative for passengers. To estimate the 
additional cost to passengers from using a competing line, the median increase in 
journey distance which would have been required by taking the best substitute was 
estimated. An example of this is shown in Panel C of Table 2 with the removal of the 
line between Sawley and Long Eaton Junction, which was part of the Midland 
Counties line. For this segment, alternative routes could be taken which enabled all of 
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the journeys to be made, but at an additional cost. The median increase in distance due 
to the unavailability of this line was 20 miles, or 8.5 per cent of journey distance, 
suggesting that this segment was exposed to competition as passengers could have 
taken other routes to their destination for a relatively modest increase in journey time. 
The median across all segments is reported in Table 4. Overall, the median 
increase in journey times by taking the best substitute was 22 per cent for lines in 
1843, 9 per cent for those same lines in 1850, and 6 per cent for all lines in 1850. 
Mann-Whitney tests suggest that there were significant differences in the cost of 
taking a substitute between 1843 and 1850, when all segments are analysed. When 
broken down by importance of segment, eight of the ten Mann-Whitney tests indicate 
significant differences between 1843 and 1850. 
<< INSERT TABLE 4 >> 
The analysis was also repeated to see whether the increase in competition had 
more of an effect on short or long journeys.  For each segment where an alternative 
was available, the median increase in journey distances for each of these categories 
was calculated.  From Table 4, we can see that if passengers had been undertaking 
short journeys (less than 10 miles) and had been forced to take the best available 
substitute, they would have needed to increase their journey time by 1,765 per cent in 
1843, by 1,026 per cent for those same lines in 1850, and by 959 per cent for all lines 
in 1850. Passengers undertaking the longest journeys would have faced an increase by 
taking an alternative of 5 per cent in 1843, by 3 per cent for those same lines in 1850, 
and by 3 per cent for all lines in 1850. There was also a substantial and significant 
decrease in the cost of substitution between 1843 and 1850 for journeys of 
intermediate length. 
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 The results across each category of journey length suggest that the additional 
cost for rail passengers of taking an alternative approximately halved between 1843 
and 1850. In 1850, railway lines retained an effective monopoly over short journeys, 
as the cost of substitution remained very high, but for journeys over 50 miles, the 
additional cost had fallen to 30 per cent, and for journeys over 100 miles to just 11 per 
cent.   
 
4. Decline in Financial Performance during 1840s 
The promotional frenzy resulted in railways being exposed to greater competition for 
traffic and companies expanding simply in order to kill off a rival company.  Notably, 
The Economist in 1848 stated that the pre-Mania system differed from the post-Mania 
one in that unremunerative lines extended to thinly populated districts and the 
established lines had to share their traffic with newly-established routes.
42
 Table 5 
shows how mileage, receipts and passenger numbers changed during the 1840s.  
Railway mileage grew by 205 per cent. However, although the number of passengers 
grew by 180 per cent, passenger receipts only grew by 109 per cent, which partially 
reflects the effect of competition.   
<< INSERT TABLE 5 >> 
To evaluate the effect on companies, Table 6 compares averages for a number 
of variables for established companies (i.e., those established before 1843) in 1843 
and 1850 and new railways (i.e., those established from 1844 onwards) in 1850.  The 
results illustrate that the mileage operated by established companies grew 
dramatically between 1843 and 1850, from an average of 36 miles to 153 miles, 
reflecting both expansion and consolidation due to amalgamations, whilst the 
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population/mile ratio for established companies fell from an average of 11,761 in 
1843 to 7,013 in 1850. 
 The competition faced by the railways is then analysed. A particular route 
could be exposed to competition from lines run either by the same company, or by 
another company. In 1843, 72 per cent of the routes had a complete monopoly, with 
no other route providing any competition. However, by 1850, only 32 per cent of the 
routes run by established companies had a complete monopoly. When analysed only 
with respect to competition from other companies, 85 per cent of routes had a 
monopoly in 1843, but this had fallen to 66 per cent by 1850 for the established 
companies. It seems likely that this increase in competition played a role in the 
reduction in average fares, which fell for every class of passenger. 
 These results illustrate three forces impacting on the financial performance of 
the railways. Firstly, the expansion of the railways led to reductions in the 
population/mile which were served. Secondly, many railway companies promoted 
lines which at least partially duplicated their own existing lines. Thirdly, there was an 
increase in competition between companies. 
 These fed into a fall in average receipts per mile between 1843 and 1850, with 
the result that profit per mile falls from £1,811 in 1843 to £1,231 in 1850.  The 
average return on capital also falls in this period and the dividend/par ratio nearly 
halves.  The new railways which are operating in 1850 have even lower profits per 
mile and a return on capital below that of the established companies. 
<< INSERT TABLE 6>> 
Much of the blame for the reductions in financial performance at the time was 
blamed on the overexpansion which had taken place. For example, The Economist 
stated in 1848 that all recent experience had shown that the lines which had recently 
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been constructed had shown little or no profit.
43
 This was partly because they often 
competed with other lines, and as Gale, a contemporary jurist, argued: ‘the obvious 
effect of the concession of a competing line is to diminish, if not destroy, the profits 
of the old line; and it is not likely that it can, by entering into competition with the old 
line, itself be highly profitable’.44 Arnold and McCartney estimate that in 1850, the 
return on equity of the York and North Midland’s pre-Mania network was 10.1 per 
cent, whereas the return on the Mania part of its network -0.3 per cent.
45
  
To ascertain the effect of the promotion boom of the 1840s on dividends over 
the long run, the dividend rate of each railway company over the period 1832-70 was 
obtained from the Course of the Exchange, and aggregated to calculate the total 
dividend payments of the railway industry.  As shown in Figure 4, between 1843 and 
1847, dividends as a percentage of par value had increased from 4.7 per cent to 7.0 
per cent. However, in the aftermath of the expansion of the network, dividends then 
fell dramatically, reaching just 2.7 per cent by the end of 1850
46
.  Dividends recovered 
slowly during the 1850s and even after a temporary boom in the 1860s, dividends 
never got near their pre-boom heights again.    
<< INSERT FIGURE 4 >> 
Although dividends did not begin to decline until 1847, when many of the new 
lines were being opened, share prices began to fall in the autumn of 1845 as investors 
began to foresee the reduction in payouts which they could expect.
47
 Figure 5 
illustrates the substantial increase in the number of railway securities which were 
listed on the London Stock Exchange during the period, and of particular note is the 
huge rise in the number of securities listed in late summer and autumn of 1845
48
.  
Even this underestimates the level of railway promotion taking place in the autumn of 
1845, as not all of the projected lines obtained a stock market listing. 
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<< INSERT FIGURE 5 >> 
  The extent of this promotion was not clear prior to the latter half of 1845, but 
when the unprecedented degree of new railway formation became obvious, investors 
began to revise their expectations and started to foresee the expansion in the network 
which would eventually occur. As fears of diminishing returns and more competition 
increased, share prices started to fall and the market crash occurred in October 1845. 
As the decade progressed and the network continued to expand, the effects of the new 
lines became increasingly clear and shareholder fears deepened, depressing share 
prices further. At each annual meeting their fears were confirmed and dividends were 
repeatedly cut as the railway companies were forced to deal with the new reality of 
lower returns on capital. The dramatic decline in share prices during the latter half of 
the 1840s suggests that shareholder value was substantially reduced at this time. 
 
 
5. Managerial Strategy 
Given that the expansion of the established railways was followed by declining share 
prices, it could be argued that the directors of these companies did not effectively 
maximise shareholder wealth. This could have been due to agency problems leading 
to empire building or hubris which resulted in overly optimistic expectations about the 
potential for expansion or incompetence/inexperience. However, there is evidence that 
the established railway companies were particularly fearful of the threat posed by 
increases in competition.  
The line between London and Southampton can be used to illustrate the 
situation which established railways faced. In 1843 the London and South Western 
(L&SW) had a monopoly on the entire route, with it being impossible to use any other 
railway for any part of the journey. However, by 1850 the L&SW traffic was 
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threatened from the north by the Great Western Railway (GWR), and from the east by 
the South-Eastern (SE), and London, Brighton and South Coast (LBS). These 
companies had promoted and constructed additional lines which connected their main 
routes to that of the L&SW. It became possible for passengers to complete much of 
the journey on these other railways, and complete only the final section via the 
L&SW. 
For example, the direct route offered by the L&SW between London and 
Southampton was 80 miles. Alternatively, in 1850, passengers could have travelled 
via the GWR line for 56.25 miles between London and Basingstoke, only completing 
the final 32 miles by the L&SW, giving a total distance of 88.25 miles.  
Similarly, passengers could have travelled 28 miles via the LBS from London 
to Reigate Junction, then 30.33 miles via the South-Eastern to Farnborough, and then 
the final 54 miles via the L&SW, giving an overall mileage of 112.33. Finally, 
passengers could have avoided the L&SW entirely by travelling on the LBS line, but 
the overall mileage would have been 133.25 miles. 
Although the journeys would have been slightly longer, they could have easily 
been made attractive by the GWR, SE and LBS offering low fares on the newly built 
extensions. However, it would be difficult to argue that there was managerial failure 
on the part of the GWR, SE and LBS who constructed the lines. The short extensions 
offered the opportunity to increase traffic on their main lines by diverting it from the 
L&SW. 
A counterfactual analysis can be used to assess whether the strategy pursued 
by the managers of the established railways during this period was optimal. Three 
scenarios are considered. First, the railway companies of 1843 remained unchanged 
i.e., managers had done nothing – no expansion and no mergers and the competing 
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companies built the other lines instead. Second, the railway companies of 1843 had 
pursued the mergers which they actually did pursue, but did not undertake any 
additional expansion. Third, the actual situation in 1850 whereby the railway 
companies of 1843 had engaged in mergers and undertook substantial additional 
expansion. 
 The general results of the counterfactual analysis in Table 7 reveal the 
following. The worst scenario in terms of competitive pressures is when managers do 
nothing.  In other words, had managers simply done nothing, there would have been 
more competition from rivals than there actually was.   
Engaging in mergers, but not expanding, produces a marginally better result in 
terms of competitive pressures than simply doing nothing. Notably, the inevitability of 
amalgamation was pointed out in 1844 by the Railway Times, when they said ‘two 
companies could not fight and ruin themselves at low fares for the benefit of the 
public, but would of course coalesce at their expense.’49  
It was common for large companies to merge with each other. For example, 
the London and North Western was formed by a merger of the already major 
companies of the London and Birmingham, the Manchester and Birmingham, the 
Grand Junction, the Liverpool and Manchester and several smaller lines. At the end of 
1850, the London and North-Western had a paid-up capital greater than that of the 
Bank of England. 
Another form of amalgamation involved a large parent company paying a 
guaranteed rate of dividend to the shareholders of another smaller company for the 
long-term use of their line. The difficulty with this approach was that ‘the whole risk 
of a diminution of receipts is thrown upon the purchaser’.50 These guarantees 
represented a ‘certain future preferable claim on the receipts of the main line’.51 If the 
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purchased line earned more than the fixed dividend, the parent company kept this as 
profit, but if it earned less, as many did during the downturn, the parent company 
would have to subsidise it from its other lines. 
Another possibility may have been collusion. However, with the rapid rise of 
new competitors, it would have been risky to have relied on collusion instead of 
expansion. Once the competitors had themselves expanded and opened their lines, 
they may have found that there was an incentive to compete. Experience had shown 
that there had been damaging price wars in the past, such as between the Midland 
Counties and the Birmingham and Derby.
52
 The solution to these had been full 
amalgamations, rather than collusion. 
The best scenario in Table 7 in terms of competitive pressures is what actually 
happened i.e., companies engaged in mergers and expanded.  Notably, the monopoly 
over routes of some of the major railways was considerably enhanced by their 
expansion and not their mergers.  In other words, had managers not expanded their 
rail networks during the boom, their companies would have faced even greater 
competitive pressures than they did.  
<< INSERT TABLE 7>> 
This counterfactual analysis suggests that one of the most effective means of 
addressing the threat from parvenus was for the established railways to promote their 
own lines. Ultimately, the actions of companies were likely motivated by a fear that if 
they did not project a new line themselves, the route would be built by someone else, 
which would increase their exposure to competition. The Economist, for example, 
suggested that few had been undertaken for their own merits, but for the purpose of 
averting threatened opposition.
53
 Jackman has noted that ‘nothing was more common 
than to see a company eagerly seeking authority to make a branch which could only 
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bring it a loss, but which, it was feared, would cause still greater loss if it fell into the 
hands of a rival’.54  
 To analyse the relationship between expansion and the threat of competition, 
we run a series of regressions which are shown in Table 8. The dependent variable in 
each regression is the difference between the actual mileage of railway open for each 
company in 1850, minus the counterfactual of the number of miles which would have 
been open if the companies had merged but not expanded.  
<< INSERT TABLE 8 >> 
 Table 8 reveals that those companies which were likely to have greater 
monopoly power under the counterfactual, expanded the least. This implies that those 
firms which had the greatest potential exposure to competition were those which 
expanded the most. Even though the sample size is necessarily small, the results 
indicate a highly significant relationship. 
 Table 8 also considers the impact of other control variables on expansion. 
Companies which already had the largest networks under the counterfactual were 
those which were more likely to expand, implying that large companies wanted to get 
even larger. However, we find little evidence of a relationship between expansion and 
the population served by the railways per mile. After controlling for these other 
variables, the relationship between potential competition and expansion remains 
significant. This suggests that the threat of competition was an important 
consideration in the decision by railways to expand during this period. 
 
6. Size and Performance 
Although the desire to head off competition may have provided a rationale for 
expansion, it is possible that this strategy may have been misguided. The pertinent 
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question is whether expansion was valuable, given the new environment within which 
firms were operating. They were faced with numerous potential competitors, with a 
torrent of applications for new railway schemes, particularly in 1845. Although 
companies engaged in lobbying against rivals and attempted to get them thrown out of 
Parliamentary contests, railway managers were fighting a losing battle on this front.  
Parliament sanctioned a large proportion of the new schemes.   
Given the expansion of others, firms had to choose the best strategy to deal 
with this situation. To analyse whether expansion was optimal, we consider the cross-
section of firms in 1850, and analyse whether firms with larger networks performed 
better. We begin in Table 9 by analysing the relationship between the mileage 
operated by each company, and the Return on Capital Employed of that firm.
55
 Each 
variable is expressed in logs to allow an estimate of the percentage impact on 
profitability from a one percentage increase in mileage of track open. The results 
indicate a highly significant positive relationship, with larger firms enjoying higher 
returns on capital. 
<< INSERT TABLE 9 >> 
A caveat to this result is the small sample size, which arises because 
profitability data was available for the full year of 1850 for just 17 companies
56
. To 
confirm the robustness of our results, we use several other components of financial 
performance, for which larger sample sizes are available. Several Parliamentary 
Papers
57
 reported detailed information on the revenue for each railway company, 
broken down into how much was received from carrying goods, and how much from 
passengers. Another Parliamentary Paper also reported the capital employed by each 
firm.
58
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From this data, we calculate revenue to capital measures, and analyse whether 
larger companies earned higher revenues for each unit of capital employed. The 
results suggest a significant positive relationship between the size of a company’s 
network and total receipts, receipts from goods, and receipts from passengers. 
To analyse the source of this advantage to large firms, we exploit the detailed 
information provided on revenues from passengers, which is broken down for each 
company into the number of passengers who travelled, and the average fare per mile. 
From this information, we can also calculate the total passenger miles, and the 
average number of miles travelled by each passenger.  
To decompose the determinants of revenues, we split the receipts to capital 
variable into several ratios, as shown in Equation 1. 
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Where: R = Receipts from Passengers 
  Z = Total Passenger Miles 
   P = Number of Passengers 
  D = Population of Districts served by that railway 
  M = Miles of track open 
  C = Capital Employed 
 
By taking logs of both sides, and referring to the logged variables in lower case, this 
can be rewritten as Equation 2.  
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(2) 
 
This implies that the passenger receipts to capital ratio of each railway will be 
affected by an improvement or deterioration in any of these component ratios i.e., an 
increase in receipts per passenger mile (r/z), or the number of miles travelled by each 
passenger (z/p), etc. would tend to improve the receipts to capital ratio.   
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We then regress the size of each company’s network against each ratio 
individually. The results are shown in Table 10. As all variables are in logs, the 
coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in a ratio, from a one percent 
increase in the size of a company’s mileage of track open. This methodology allows 
us to analyse the mechanisms by which size affects financial performance. Given the 
relationship in Equation 2, the betas showing how size affects each component ratio 
can be summed to obtain the overall impact that size has on the receipts to capital 
ratio. 
<< INSERT TABLE 10 >> 
Size has a small positive impact on receipts per passenger mile (r/z), implying 
that larger firms earned slightly higher fares for each mile that a passenger travelled. 
There is a stronger relationship between size and the average number of miles 
travelled by each passenger (z/p). This means that any given passenger tended to 
travel further on a large railway than on a small one, therefore paying more to the 
railway company for their ticket. 
 Size also has a large positive effect on the ratio between the number of 
passengers who travelled on the railways, and the number of people who lived in 
districts served by that railway (p/d). This could be because people had a greater 
propensity to travel on trains operated by large companies, or it could reflect greater 
through traffic, with passengers using the lines even though they did not live in 
surrounding areas. 
 These three factors produced positive benefits for large companies. However, 
these advantages were somewhat mitigated by other factors. Larger companies tended 
to serve lower populations per mile of track open (d/m). This reflects their expansion 
into less populous areas, and the duplication of their own lines. They also tended to 
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invest more capital for each mile of track open, or in the setup of the ratio, obtain less 
track for every unit of capital invested (m/c) which could reflect better quality, or 
poorer cost control. 
 Despite these mitigating factors, the overall impact of size was positive
59
. 
Firms with larger networks experienced better financial performance, as measured by 
the passenger receipts to capital ratio. By expanding, and reducing competitive 
threats, the railways could increase fares, keep passengers on their lines for longer, 
and gain more through traffic. 
This suggests that the expansion strategy that was pursued by many firms was 
not an example of managerial failure. Expansion may have reduced profits over time 
between 1843 and 1850, but the market as a whole changed during this period, and 
firms had to respond to the new environment. A strategy of not expanding whilst 
everybody else was would not have been optimal. In the cross-section, it was the 
larger firms that enjoyed the better performance.   
  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
The chief finding of this paper is that there is little evidence of managerial failure in 
mid-Victorian railways. There was a large expansion in the railway network, and this 
was associated with declining financial performance. However, we argue that 
managers responded in the best way they could, given the authorisation of duplicate 
and uneconomic railway schemes at this time. An alternative strategy of not 
expanding whilst competitors did, would not have been advantageous, as it was the 
largest firms who performed best.  
Thus, the well-documented managerial malaise in British railways which 
existed in the late Victorian era had not set in during the 1840s.   
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A large body of evidence suggests that later Victorian railways were poorly 
managed.
60
  So what changed?  One possibility is that ownership had separated from 
control by the later part of the Victorian era.  However, we can discount this, as 
ownership was always separated from control in the railways.
61
   
Another, more likely, possibility is that the railway industry moved from being 
competitive in the period under consideration to being monopolistic.
62
 In addition, 
there may have been a shift in focus, so that the later railways were run not so much 
for their shareholders, but for the benefit of other stakeholders, including their 
managers, industrialists, passengers, and the State.
63
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FIGURE 1: RAILWAY MAP OF GREAT BRITAIN IN 1843 AND 1850 
 
 
Sources: Reproduction of map included in Bradshaw’s Monthly General Railway and Steam Navigation Guide, adapted with 
colouring based on information in timetables within the guide. 
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FIGURE 2: COMPANY PROMOTION ADVERTS IN RAILWAY TIMES 
AND RAILWAY SHARE INDEX, 1843-50 
 
 
Sources: Word count of adverts was obtained by scanning in all company adverts in the Railway Times and running 
the scans through the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count software.  The index calculated from weekly share price 
tables in Railway Times. 
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FIGURE 3: TOTAL PAR VALUE OF RAILWAYS, 1825-70 
 
Sources: Course of the Exchange, 1825-70 and Acheson et al., “Rule Britannia”. 
Notes: This is a 12-month moving average of total par value of British railways traded on the 
London Stock Exchange. 
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FIGURE 4: ANNUAL RAILWAY DIVIDENDS, 1832-70 
 
 
 
Source: Course of the Exchange, 1832-70. 
Notes: Railway dividend/par index calculated as sum of dividends paid by railway companies divided by 
sum of par value of railway companies. 
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FIGURE 5: RAILWAY SECURITIES LISTED ON LONDON STOCK 
EXCHANGE AND RAILWAY SHARE INDEX, 1843-50 
 
 
Sources: Calculated from weekly share price tables in Railway Times, 1843-50. 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DISTRICTS WITH  
RAILWAY STATIONS IN 1843 AND 1850 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All lines 
in 1843  
1843 
districts 
in 1850 
 
New 
districts 
in 1850 
 
All lines 
in 1850 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Districts 188 
 
188 
 
238 
 
426 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Totals 
 
Population 7,556,592 
 
8,375,793 
 
6,229,892 
 
14,605,685 
 
 
Mileage 1,505 
 
2,568 
 
2,456 
 
5,024 
 
 
Stations 339 
 
705 
 
688 
 
1,393 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristics of Median District 
 
Population 27,713 
 
30,068 
 
20,689 
 
22,918 
 
 
Pop/km2 (Eng&Wales) 114.2 
 
121.3 
 
73.4 
 
87.7 
 
 
Mileage 6.6 
 
11.0 
 
8.1 
 
9.7 
 
 
Stations 1.0 
 
3.0 
 
2.0 
 
3.0 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Differences in Sample Median from 1843 Sample Median 
 
Population 
  
2,355  -7,024  -4,796  
 
Pop/km2 (Eng&Wales) 
  
7.1  -40.8  -26.5  
 
Mileage 
  
4.4  1.5  3.1  
 
Stations 
  
2.0  1.0  2.0  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance of Mann-Whitney Tests Comparing Sample with 1843 Sample 
 
Population 
  
 
 ***  **  
 
Pop/km2 (Eng&Wales) 
  
 
 ***  ***  
 
Mileage 
  
***  ***  ***  
 
Stations 
  
***  ***  ***  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: List of railway stations and mileage data obtained from Bradshaw's Monthly General Railway and Steam Navigation 
Guide. Registration districts for each station found by using  the 1851 Census Index to the Names of the Parishes, Townships, 
and Places in the Population tables of Great Britain  and supplemented with the GENUKI Gazetteer and the Vision of Britain 
historical units database. Population of each district, at each time, was calculated from the 1851 Census by taking the reported 
1841 and 1851 populations for each district and determining the average annual change, to estimate the populations in 1843 and 
1850. Population density based on England and Wales, using data on the area of registration districts obtained from EDINA. 
Mileage per district calculated by assuming a particular segment of railway was equally divided between the districts which that 
segment connected. Mann-Whitney tests have a null hypothesis that the samples are drawn from the same population, whilst the 
alternative hypothesis is that the probability of an observation from one sample exceeding an observation from a second sample 
is not equal to 0.5.  Significance given by *** p<0.01,** p<0.05. 
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TABLE 2: MILEAGE BETWEEN SELECTED RAILWAY STATIONS IN 1843  
IF SHORTEST ROUTE CHOSEN 
Panel A: Full 1843 Railway Network 
 
Birmingham Brighton Bristol Derby Liverpool London Manchester Southampton York 
Birmingham 0.0 163.0 230.8 41.3 98.5 112.5 84.8 192.5 128.8 
Brighton 163.0 0.0 168.8 184.3 261.5 50.5 247.8 130.5 271.8 
Bristol 230.8 168.8 0.0 252.0 329.3 118.3 315.5 198.3 339.5 
Derby 41.3 184.3 252.0 0.0 139.8 133.8 115.3 213.8 87.5 
Liverpool 98.5 261.5 329.3 139.8 0.0 211.0 31.5 291.0 107.8 
London 112.5 50.5 118.3 133.8 211.0 0.0 197.3 80.0 221.3 
Manchester 84.8 247.8 315.5 115.3 31.5 197.3 0.0 277.3 76.3 
Southampton 192.5 130.5 198.3 213.8 291.0 80.0 277.3 0.0 301.3 
York 128.8 271.8 339.5 87.5 107.8 221.3 76.3 301.3 0.0 
          Panel B: Without Blisworth to Roade Railway Segment 
 
Birmingham Brighton Bristol Derby Liverpool London Manchester Southampton York 
Birmingham 0.0 N/A N/A 41.3 98.5 N/A 84.8 N/A 128.8 
Brighton N/A 0.0 168.8 N/A N/A 50.5 N/A 130.5 N/A 
Bristol N/A 168.8 0.0 N/A N/A 118.3 N/A 198.3 N/A 
Derby 41.3 N/A N/A 0.0 139.8 N/A 115.3 N/A 87.5 
Liverpool 98.5 N/A N/A 139.8 0.0 N/A 31.5 N/A 107.8 
London N/A 50.5 118.3 N/A N/A 0.0 N/A 80.0 N/A 
Manchester 84.8 N/A N/A 115.3 31.5 N/A 0.0 N/A 76.3 
Southampton N/A 130.5 198.3 N/A N/A 80.0 N/A 0.0 N/A 
York 128.8 N/A N/A 87.5 107.8 N/A 76.3 N/A 0.0 
 
Number of Routes Affected: 40 
Median Increase in Mileage: No Substitute Available 
          
Panel C: Without Sawley to Long Eaton Junction Railway Segment 
 
Birmingham Brighton Bristol Derby Liverpool London Manchester Southampton York 
Birmingham 0.0 163.0 230.8 41.3 98.5 112.5 84.8 192.5 128.8 
Brighton 163.0 0.0 168.8 204.3 261.5 50.5 247.8 130.5 291.8 
Bristol 230.8 168.8 0.0 272.0 329.3 118.3 315.5 198.3 359.5 
Derby 41.3 204.3 272.0 0.0 139.8 153.8 115.3 233.8 87.5 
Liverpool 98.5 261.5 329.3 139.8 0.0 211.0 31.5 291.0 107.8 
London 112.5 50.5 118.3 153.8 211.0 0.0 197.3 80.0 241.3 
Manchester 84.8 247.8 315.5 115.3 31.5 197.3 0.0 277.3 76.3 
Southampton 192.5 130.5 198.3 233.8 291.0 80.0 277.3 0.0 321.3 
York 128.8 291.8 359.5 87.5 107.8 241.3 76.3 321.3 0.0 
 
Number of Routes Affected: 16 
Median Increase in Mileage: 20 miles (8.5% of original journey times)  
 Notes: Mileage between railway stations calculated using Djikstra shortest path algorithm, with data on the mileage between 
adjacent stations obtained from  Bradshaw's Monthly General Railway and Steam Navigation Guide. Journeys affected by the 
removal of segments are highlighted in Panels B and C. 
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TABLE 3: RAILWAY SEGMENTS WITH NO SUBSTITUTE AVAILABLE 
     
 Importance 
of segment 
quintile 
Number of 
segments in 
quintile 
Average number 
of routes affected 
by each segment 
Segments with no  
substitute available  
 
 
(%) 
Difference in % 
of segments with no 
substitute 
from 1843 
(%) 
Panel A: 1843 
Least 57 153 86 - 
 2 87 1,559 91 - 
 3 71 5,250 80 - 
 4 67 10,375 46 - 
 Most 71 24,018 31 - 
  
   - 
 Overall 353 8,265 67 - 
  
     Panel B: 1843 lines in 1850 
Least 70 837 53 -33 *** 
2 68 2,685 12 -79 *** 
3 73 4,568 12 -68 *** 
4 71 9,850 11 -35 *** 
Most 70 23,153 0 -31 *** 
 
     Overall 352 8,224 18 -50 *** 
 
     Panel C: 1850 
Least 309 4,868 73 -13 *** 
2 310 16,745 38 -52 *** 
3 309 37,310 22 -58 *** 
4 310 82,416 8 -38 *** 
Most 309 250,130 4 -27 *** 
 
     Overall 1547 78,257 29 -38 *** 
 
     Notes: Calculated using Djikstra shortest path algorithm, with data on the mileage between adjacent stations obtained from Bradshaw's 
Monthly General Railway and Steam Navigation Guide. Segments of railway network categorised into quintiles by their importance, 
which was measured by the number of journeys on which they had some impact. Two-sample-proportion tests are used to calculate 
significance of difference between proportion of segments with no substitutes available in 1843 compared with 1850.  Significance 
given by *** p<0.01, indicating a rejection of the null hypothesis that the proportions in 1843 and 1850 were equal. 
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TABLE 4: INCREASE IN RAILWAY JOURNEY TIMES IF BEST SUBSTITUTE TAKEN INSTEAD 
Importance 
of Segment 
Quintile 
Number of 
Segments 
in Quintile 
Average 
Number of 
Routes 
Affected  
% of 
segments 
with a 
substitute 
available 
 Median Increase in Journey Mileage (as a Percentage of Original Journey Length) Required by Taking 
the Best Substitute, for those segments where substitute is available 
 
Difference 
In Sample 
Median 
With 1843 
Median 
(%) 
Mann-
Whitney 
test 
comparing 
sample 
with 1843 
sample 
Length of original journeys in miles: 
<10 10-25 25-50 50-75 75-100 100-
150 
150-
200 
200-
250 
250-
300 
>300  All 
lengths 
Panel A: 1843 
Least 57 153 14 
 
689 131 11 - - - - - - - 
 
96 - 
 2 87 1,559 9 
 
674 130 56 27 19 13 8 4 3 3 
 
14 - 
 3 71 5,250 20 
 
1483 438 137 58 45 21 17 14 4 2 
 
21 - 
 4 67 10,375 54 
 
1650 520 208 63 49 23 17 6 5 4 
 
23 - 
 Most 71 24,018 69 
 
3049 1022 415 196 103 37 29 23 19 16 
 
22 - 
    
                Overall 353 8,265 33 
 
1765 474 154 64 64 25 18 9 7 5 
 
22 - 
 Panel B: 1843 lines in 1850 
Least 70 837 47 
 
1049 252 47 51 22 16 11 5 5 3 
 
9% -86% *** 
2 68 2,685 88 
 
1061 302 77 29 19 16 9 5 3 2 
 
10% -4% 
 
3 73 4,568 88 
 
1204 270 73 27 15 13 9 6 4 4 
 
10% -11% 
 
4 71 9,850 89 
 
755 204 54 19 12 8 6 3 2 2 
 
5% -18% *** 
Most 70 23,153 100 
 
1663 509 190 73 31 21 14 9 7 5 
 
9% -12% *** 
   
               
 
Overall 352 8,224 82 
 
1026 267 74 30 19 15 10 6 4 3 
 
9% -12% *** 
   
               Difference in sample median with 1843 median 
 
-739 -206 -80 -34 -44% -10% -8% -4 -3 -3 
 
-12 
  Mann-Whitney test comparing sample with 1843 sample 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
*** 
  Panel C: 1850 
Least 309 4,868 27 
 
484 107 25 12 7 4 3 3 2 2 
 
5% -91% *** 
2 310 16,745 62 
 
668 153 37 18 12 8 6 4 4 2 
 
6% -8% ** 
3 309 37,310 78 
 
1096 286 78 33 25 12 8 6 4 4 
 
7% -14% *** 
4 310 82,416 92 
 
1415 393 112 45 29 16 8 4 3 3 
 
7% -17% *** 
Most 309 250,130 96 
 
843 229 69 44 25 16 10 7 6 3 
 
7% -15% *** 
   
                Overall 1547 78,257 71 
 
959 238 67 30 20 11 7 5 4 3 
 
6% -15% *** 
   
               Difference in sample median with 1843 median 
 
-806 -236 -86 -34 -44% -14% -11% -5 -4 -3 
 
-15 
  Mann-Whitney test comparing sample with 1843 sample 
 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***  *** 
  Notes: Calculated using Djikstra shortest path algorithm, with data on the mileage between adjacent stations from Bradshaw's Monthly General Railway and Steam Navigation Guide. Segments of railway network 
categorised into quintiles by their importance, which was measured by the number of journeys on which they had some impact. Journeys categorised according to their length. For each segment where a substitute was 
available, the median increase in journey distances by taking best available substitute is reported. Mann-Whitney tests used to calculate significance of difference in increase in journey times between 1843 and 1850. 
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TABLE 5: INDUSTRY MILEAGE AND RECEIPTS 
     
Growth  (%) 
Year 
Miles 
Open 
Goods  
Receipts 
Passenger  
Receipts 
Number of  
Passengers Miles Receipts Passengers 
1842 2,069 1,698,307 3,082,760 24,492,957 
   
... ... ... ... ... 
   
1845 2,343 2,233,373 3,976,311 33,791,253 13.2 29.0 38.0 
1846 2,765 2,840,353 4,795,215 43,790,083 18.0 20.6 29.6 
1847 3,603 3,382,883 5,148,002 51,352,163 30.3 7.4 17.3 
1848 4,478 4,213,169 5,720,382 57,965,070 24.3 11.1 12.9 
1849 5,447 5,094,925 6,105,975 60,398,159 21.6 6.7 4.2 
1850 6,308 5,942,246 6,465,570 66,839,375 15.8 5.9 10.7 
        Sources: Parliamentary Papers (1844), XI, ‘Fifth report from the Select Committee on Railways; together with the minutes of evidence, appendix and index,’ Appendix 2, 
p.8. Parliamentary Papers (1850), LIII, p.257, ‘Railways. Return of the number of passengers conveyed on all the railways in the United Kingdom during the half-year 
ending the 30th June 1849; showing the different classes, the receipts from each class, and from goods, &c.; compiled from returns made to the Commissioners of Railways 
by each railway company, in pursuance of the provisions of the act 3 & 4 Vict. c. 97; also, the number of miles of railway open, and a comparative statement of the traffic, 
for the five years ending 30th June 1845, 1846, 1847, 1848 and 1849.’Parliamentary Papers (1851), LI, p.229, ‘Railways. Return, showing the Number of Passengers 
Conveyed on All the Railways in England and Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, respectively, during the half-year ending the 30th June 1850’.Notes: Includes Ireland. 
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TABLE 6: COMPANY MILEAGE, COMPETITION AND PERFORMANCE IN 1843 AND 1850 
 
Mileage 
Open 
Pop/Mile 
% of Routes with Monopoly 
% Increase in mileage 
from alternative route 
Average Fares Per 
Mile 
Receipt/ 
Mile (£) 
Expenses/ 
Mile (£) 
Profit/ 
Mile (£) 
Return on 
Capital (%) 
Dividend/ 
Par 
From Own 
Lines &  
Other 
Companies 
From Other  
Companies 
1st 
Class  
2nd 
Class 
3rd 
Class 
Average for established 
companies in 1843 
(N = 44) 
 
36 11,761 72 85 30 2.6 1.8 1.2 3,603 1,792 1,811 4.7 4.8 
Average for established 
companies in 1850 
(N = 25) 
 
153 7,013 32 66 9 2.2 1.5 0.9 2,559 1,328 1,231 3.3 2.5 
Average for new 
companies in 1850 
(N = 37) 
 
40 7,636 63 82 6 2.2 1.6 0.9 1,565 874 691 1.9 1.6 
Sources: Authors’ calculations, and Parliamentary Papers (1844), XI, ‘Fifth report from the Select Committee on Railways; together with the minutes of evidence, appendix and index,’ Appendix 2, p.8-14, and 
Slaughter, M. (1850), ‘Railway Intelligence, published under the authority of the Stock Exchange’.  
Notes: Accounting data on receipts, expenses, profits and dividends only available for a subsample of companies (30 established companies in 1843, 12 established companies in 1850, and 6 new companies in 1850). 
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TABLE 7: COUNTERFACTUAL OF ALTERNATIVE POSSIBLE MANAGERIAL STRATEGIES FOR ESTABLISHED RAILWAYS IN 1850 
Post-Merger 
Company 
(1850) 
Pre-Merger 
Company 
(1843) 
No Mergers and No Expansion Between 1843 and 1850  Mergers but No Expansion Between 1843 and 1850  Mergers and Expansion Between 1843 and 1850 
Miles 
Open 
Population 
/Mile 
% of Routes 
with Monopoly 
from External 
Competition 
% Increase 
in Mileage 
from 
Alternative 
 Miles 
Open 
Population
/Mile 
% of Routes 
with Monopoly 
from External 
Competition 
% Increase 
in Mileage 
from 
Alternative 
 Miles 
Open 
Population
/Mile 
% of Routes 
with Monopoly 
from External 
Competition 
% Increase 
in Mileage 
from 
Alternative 
London & 
North Western 
London and Birmingham 113 5,150 19 11  309 7,791 23 14  516 7,077 49 11 
Grand Junction 83 9,802 10 3  
    
 
    Liverpool Manchester 32 22,705 13 2  
    
 
    Manchester and Birmingham 31 20,378 10 7  
    
 
    North Union 23 9,281 4 3  
    
 
    Chester and Crewe 21 7,287 11 25  
    
 
    Aylesbury 7 5,701 100 0  
    
 
    
Midland 
North Midland 74 5,862 12 5  232 5,898 19 6  451 5,195 37 5 
Midland Counties 57 6,707 20 14  
    
 
    Birmingham Gloucester 55 7,129 24 30  
    
 
    Birmingham Derby 41 9,537 7 1  
    
 
    Sheffield and Rotherham 5 26,889 0 9  
    
 
    
Eastern Counties 
Northern and Eastern 29 4,596 42 6  46 7,716 34 23  330 3,648 93 4 
EasternCounties 18 14,620 8 22  
    
 
    York, Newc & 
Berwick 
GNER 45 3,554 16 27  52 5,976 18 28  284 2,578 68 12 
Newcastle and NorthShields 7 21,544 100 0  
    
 
    York &  
N. Midland 
Hull and Selby 39 4,035 32 12  63 4,589 14 16  251 1,924 63 1 
York and North Midland 24 7,438 6 17  
    
 
    
Lancashire & 
Yorkshire 
Manchester and Leeds 55 14,452 22 12  107 8,888 24 7  239 9,393 31 4 
Preston and Wyre 27 4,342 100 0  
    
 
    Bolton and Preston 15 10,054 11 1  
    
 
    Manchester and Bolton 10 33,782 8 2  
    
 
    L&SW London and South Western 96 2,867 59 8  96 2,867 59 8  235 2,657 88 3 
G. Western Great Western 190 3,694 67 4  145 4,105 50 5  228 3,684 66 2 
South Eastern 
South Eastern 46 2,351 100 0  50 5,285 100 0  212 3,093 94 7 
London and Greenwich 4 43,845 100 0  
    
 
    Caledonian Garnkirk and Glasgow 11 43,314 4 3  11 43,314 4 3  165 6,136 29 12 
MSL Sheffield Ashton Manchester 13 37,737 22 6  13 37,737 22 6  161 5,815 37 9 
London, Brighton 
Sth Coast 
London and Brighton 46 4,705 36 12  57 4,841 43 12  160 4,142 61 11 
London and Croydon 10 8,527 3 12  
    
 
    Lanc&Carl. Lancaster and Preston 40 4,142 6 14  40 4,142 6 14  90 4,789 12 14 
Edin&Glas. Edinburgh and Glasgow 60 14,318 50 4  60 14,318 50 4  83 10,295 50 4 
Glasgow, Pais,  
Kilm & Ayr 
Glasgow, Pais, Kilm & Ayr 48 13,489 100 0  51 12,688 100 0  75 8,572 100 0 
Paisley and Renfrew 3 37,203 100 0  
    
 
    Aberdeen Arbroath and Forfar 15 6,364 100 53  15 6,364 100 53  64 2,026 100 48 
Newc&Carl Newcastle and Carlisle 59 3,783 63 8  59 3,783 63 8  60 3,721 64 8 
Stock&Darl Stockton and Darlington 19 5,301 79 11  19 5,301 79 11  50 3,380 79 11 
Stock&Hart Stockton and Hartlepool 15 3,442 100 0  15 3,442 100 0  47 2,269 39 14 
Taff Vale Taff Vale 23 11,979 100 0  23 11,979 100 0  40 8,193 100 0 
Scot Mid. Dundee and Newtyle 37 7,748 19 1  37 7,748 19 1  33 6,552 38 1 
Dund&Arb Dundee and Arbroath 13 14,935 57 1  13 14,935 57 1  17 11,351 57 1 
BLC Chester and Birkenhead 16 6,935 100 0  16 6,935 100 0  16 12,255 100 0 
Ardrossan Ardrossan 7 12,762 100 0  7 12,762 100 0  7 12,762 100 0 
Lond&Blac London and Blackwall 3 33,830 100 0  3 33,830 100 0  3 33,830 100 0 
 Average 36 13,139 46 8  61 11,089 55 9  153 7,013 66 7 
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TABLE 8: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPANSION AND  
STRENGTH OF MONOPOLY WITHOUT EXPANSION 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
MonopolyPctNoExp -1.422***   -1.116** 
 (0.395)   (0.516) 
MilesOpenNoExp  0.600***  0.391** 
  (0.121)  (0.187) 
PopMileNoExp   -0.000 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 169.859*** 54.169** 93.960*** 127.654** 
 (30.921) (19.884) (25.142) (59.053) 
     
Observations 25 25 25 25 
R-squared 0.337 0.241 0.001 0.421 
     
Notes: The dependent variable is the difference in the number of miles of railway actually open in 1850, compared to the number of miles which 
would have been open if mergers had taken place but no expansion. MonopolyPctNoExp is the percentage of routes with a monopoly from external 
competition if mergers had taken place but no expansion. MilesOpenNoExp is the number of miles of railway track which would have been open if 
mergers had taken place but no expansion. PopMile is the population per mile if mergers had taken place but no expansion. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Significance denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 9: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SIZE OF EACH COMPANY’S NETWORK  
AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Profits 
/ 
Capital 
Receipts  
(Total) 
/  
Capital 
Receipts  
(Goods)  
/  
Capital 
Receipts (Passengers)  
/  
Capital 
     
MilesOpen 0.323** 0.162*** 0.146* 0.236*** 
 (0.120) (0.056) (0.079) (0.057) 
Constant -5.291*** -3.658*** -4.341*** -4.763*** 
 (0.654) (0.256) (0.358) (0.264) 
     
Observations 17 55 55 55 
R-squared 0.201 0.120 0.052 0.236 
     
Notes: All variables expressed in logs. MilesOpen is the number of miles of railway open for each company in 1850. Profits/Capital is the profitability of each 
company in 1850, scaled by the amount of capital invested in that company at the end of 1850. Data calculated from Slaughter, M. (1850), ‘Railway 
Intelligence, published under the authority of the Stock Exchange’. Receipts are the revenues in 1850 in total, and from goods and passengers respectively, 
scaled by the amount of capital invested in that company at the end of 1850. Data calculated from Parliamentary Papers (1851), LI, p.229, ‘Railways. Return, 
showing the Number of Passengers Conveyed on All the Railways in England and Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, respectively, during the half-year ending the 
30th June 1850’, Parliamentary Papers (1851), LI, p.241, ‘Railways. Return, showing the number of passengers conveyed on all the railways in England and 
Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, respectively, during the half-year ended the 31st December 1850’ and Parliamentary Papers (1851), LI, p.177, Railways. 
Return, showing for each railway company the amount of capital and loans which the company has been authorized to raise by acts passed previous to and in 
1850; the amount of share capital actually paid up on the 31st day of December 1850.’ Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance given by *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 10: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SIZE OF EACH COMPANY’S NETWORK  
AND COMPONENTS OF PASSENGER RECEIPTS 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Receipts  
(Passengers)  
/  
Capital 
Receipts 
(Passengers)  
/ 
Passenger 
Miles 
Passenger 
Miles 
/ 
Number of 
Passengers 
Number of 
Passengers 
/ 
Population of 
Districts 
Population of 
Districts 
/ 
Miles 
Open 
Miles 
Open 
/ 
Capital 
       
 (r/c) (r/z) (z/p) (p/d) (d/m) (m/c) 
       
MilesOpen 0.236*** 0.043** 0.331*** 0.298*** -0.272*** -0.164*** 
 (0.057) (0.020) (0.035) (0.077) (0.076) (0.060) 
Constant -4.763*** -5.346*** 1.184*** -0.681* 9.666*** -9.586*** 
 (0.264) (0.091) (0.128) (0.353) (0.329) (0.271) 
       
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 55 
R-squared 0.236 0.084 0.590 0.234 0.236 0.134 
       
Notes: All variables expressed in logs. MilesOpen is the number of miles of railway open for each company in 1850. Receipts (Passengers) is the total receipts from 
passengers in 1850. PassengerMiles is the total miles travelled by passengers, and Number of Passengers is the total number of passengers, during 1850. Population of 
Districts is the total population of districts served by the railway. Capital is the total amount of capital invested in each railway at the end of 1850. Data calculated from 
Parliamentary Papers (1851), LI, p.229, ‘Railways. Return, showing the Number of Passengers Conveyed on All the Railways in England and Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, 
respectively, during the half-year ending the 30th June 1850’, Parliamentary Papers (1851), LI, p.241, ‘Railways. Return, showing the number of passengers conveyed on 
all the railways in England and Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, respectively, during the half-year ended the 31st December 1850’ and Parliamentary Papers (1851), LI, p.177, 
Railways. Return, showing for each railway company the amount of capital and loans which the company has been authorized to raise by acts passed previous to and in 
1850; the amount of share capital actually paid up on the 31st day of December 1850.’ Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance given by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1: ROBUSTNESS TESTS CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE SPEEDS WHERE 
JOURNEY TIME IS KNOWN, BUT DISTANCE IS NOT 
Year Number of 
Segments 
in Quintile 
Average 
Number 
of Routes 
Affected 
% of 
segments 
with a 
substitute 
available 
 
Median Increase in Journey Mileage (as a Percentage of Original Journey Length) Required by  
Taking the Best Substitute, for those segments where substitute is available (%) 
 
 
Length of original journeys in miles: 
<10 10-25 25-50 50-75 75-100 100-150 150-200 200-250 250-300 >300  All 
lengths 
Panel A: 15mph 
 1843 353 8,266 33 
 
1922 474 154 64 64 25 17 9 7 6 
 
21%
                 1843 lines  
in 1850 
352 7,329 82 
 
1016 262 66 29 19 13 9 5 4 3 
 
9% 
 
Difference with 1843 
 
-906 -212 -87 -35 -45 -12 -8 -4 -4 -3 
 
-12 
  
Mann Whitney Tests 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
*** 
                 1850 1,547 80,341 71
 
919 225 65 29 19 10 6 5 3 3
 
6%
  
Difference with 1843 
 
-1003 -249 -89 -35 -45 -15 -10 -4 -4 -3 
 
-15 
  
Mann Whitney Tests 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
*** 
Panel B: 20 mph 
                 1843 353 8,265 33
 
1765 474 154 64 64 25 18 9 7 5
 
22%
                 1843 lines  
in 1850 
352 8,224 82 
 
1026 267 74 30 19 15 10 6 4 3
 
9%
 
Difference with 1843 
 
-739 -206 -80 -34 -44 -10 -8 -4 -3 -3 
 
-12 
  
Mann Whitney Tests 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
*** 
                 1850 1,547 78,257 71 
 
959 238 67 30 20 11 7 5 4 3
 
6%
  
Difference with 1843 
 
-806 -236 -86 -34 -44 -14 -11 -5 -4 -3 
 
-15 
     
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
*** 
Panel C: 25 mph 
                 1843 353 8,264 33
 
1922 476 154 64 61 25 19 9 7 5
 
23%
                 1843 lines  
in 1850 
352 8,320 82 
 
1033 273 77 32 20 15 10 6 4 3
 
10%
 
Difference with 1843 
 
-888 -203 -77 -32 -41 -11 -9 -2 -3 -2 
 
-12 
  
Mann Whitney Tests 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
*** 
                 1850 1,547 78,997 71 
 
1006 263 73 33 22 13 8 5 4 3
 
6%
  
Difference with 1843 
 
-916 -213 -80 -31 -39 -12 -11 -4 -4 -2 
 
-16 
  
Mann Whitney Tests 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
*** 
Notes: Calculated using Djikstra shortest path algorithm, with data on the mileage between adjacent stations from Bradshaw's Monthly General Railway and Steam Navigation Guide. For the 24% of segments where 
Bradshaw’s only reports a journey time, and not the journey distance, alternative scenarios on speed are used to calculate distance. For each segment where a substitute was available, the median increase in journey 
distances by taking best available substitute is reported. Mann-Whitney tests used to calculate significance of difference in increase in journey times between 1843 and 1850. 
